Abstract: By studying how agents on one side of a platform, or two-sided market, affect agents on the other side, I provide evidence of the importance of understanding heterogeneity in types of agents joining the platform. Specifically, I investigate how the arrival of superstar agents affects the other side of the platform. In the context of crowdfunding, I demonstrate that the arrival of superstars increases the overall transaction levels on the platform (in what I call a halo effect), but the increase is disproportionaly experienced by agents that are similar to the superstar experience (the crowding out effect). For managers, I demonstrate that in addition to pricing and platform rules, attracting certain kinds of agents can help drive the transaction volume and size of a platform.

Abstract: Multi-sided platforms (MSP) are organizations that operate in multi-sided markets, and create value by connecting different groups of users. Multi-sided platforms add significant value to one or more sides of participants on the platform through, among other things, indirect or cross-side network effects. Intermediation between multiple groups of participants is a key value addition provided by MSPs. Extending the study by Sawhney, Prandelli, & Verona (2003), this paper classifies MSPs into three forms of intermediation – network platforms, community platforms, and marketplace platforms. The proposal discusses the key levers of platform intermediation across these forms and proposes to empirically study the differences across these forms on the levers, viz., credibility, pricing, complements, and platform architecture.

Abstract: This research examines how incumbent firms in network industries that have attained a winner-take-all status can lose their market base to rivals. We model the strength of a network firm’s installed base and its propensity to lose market share by integrating theories from the network effects and competitive dynamics. We develop hypothesis to show that network firms’ ability to maintain their status depends on the interaction of the strength of network intensity and the level of network rivalry. Under low network intensities, a firm’s winner-take-all position is more durable when network rivalry is low. On the contrary, under high network intensities, a firm’s winner-take-all position is less durable when network rivalry is low. We conclude by discussing several implications for future research and practice.

Abstract: The focus of this research is a better understanding of two-sided markets and their implications for strategy development. When developing strategy it is not sufficient to solely rely on a systematic approach towards an understanding of platform market characteristics. Sustainable competitive advantages in such markets are still only superficially understood since the focus so far lies on market characteristics and not on strategically relevant firm and relational resources. Here, it is suggested that an understanding of firms embedded into networks of other actors is crucial to the investigation of strategic competitive advantage. Therefore, different types of value creation architectures of e-mobility providers are systematically illustrated to come to first insights about architectural configurations in two-sided markets.