Abstract: BUsing a Chinese director dataset, we examined the outside director turnover in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Out empirical results shows that basically outside directors are less likely to leave the boards with higher state ownership because the SEOs have motivation to retain the outside directors for the “window dressing” reason. However, if the CEOs have power, the outside directors are more likely to leave. Further, the institutional ownership and outside directors’ social capital also lead to director turnover. This study contribute to the current corporate governance literature. First, we offered new insights into the resource dependence function directors may perform when government involvement is considered. We also contribute to board research by examining director turnover in China to extend the current research to emerging economies.

Abstract: International minority investor networks promote shareholder democracy. While international minority investor networks from liberal market economies (LMEs) drive convergence in corporate governance best practices, the defensive tactics of controlling local networks in coordinated market economies (CMEs) may neutralize minority investor interests. With reference to France, an oft-cited CME, we review the legal and institutional changes in France since 1989; the reactions of local forces to resist these developments; and illustrate their interaction through case examples. In France as in other CMEs, the tension between the global minority investor network versus local controlling network results in a hybrid model that introduces greater unpredictability in the nature and outcomes of shareholder activism initiatives.

Abstract: Although current corporate governance studies have emphasized that institutions matter for the diffusion of corporate practices, less attention has been paid to how different institutions matter for the implementation of corporate practices, especially when different shareholders who have been embedded in different institutional environments coexist. To answer the question, from the institutional perspective, we develop a theoretical framework to explain how a corporate earnings disclosure practice is implemented by different owners (i.e. Relation-oriented vs. Transaction-oriented owners) who represent different institutional features. We also examine how a board of directors functions differently in earnings disclosure, depending on ownership structure in a corporation. We test our hypotheses with the analysis of 2,151 Japanese firms for the 2005-2011 period.

Abstract: This proposal outlines what is to our knowledge the first comprehensive review of the literature on state ownership and internationalization, covering contributions from 1970 up until today. Outlining the review's structure and discussing a selection of studies to be included in the review, the Proposal highlights the range of topics, theoretical perspectives and methods found in this literature, and which will be further explored in the full paper version.

Abstract: The paper investigates under which conditions founder-managed firms in emerging markets are interested in empowering boards of directors. It argues that in emerging markets, where firm’s success crucially relies on personal connections of the founders, connections of directors can serve as a complement to those founder has, and thus ease the transition to a professionally managed firm or to the next generation of owners. In this case, directors should actively promote the company in the networks they have access to, seeking out new business opportunities for the firm. Empowering the boards provides a necessary source of intrinsic motivation for the directors to do that. We support our argumentwith a detailed case study of one of the largest Russian companies, AFK Sistema.

Abstract: In countries with weak institutional environment and constrained resources, firms face underinvestment due to the diversion of resources away from investments, or tunneling. We examine a mechanism that may address underinvestment in the face of tunneling: governance bundles of ownership and board characteristics. Using data from Russian firms, we find a positive effect of resources on the capital expenditures when state-owned enterprises (SOEs) appoint independent board directors. However, these effects are substantially reduced for oligarchic firms. Board independence is a substitute for ownership for SOEs, while an insider board complements ownership for both oligarchic and state firms in terms of monitoring the efficient allocation of funds. We shed light on implications of governance bundles on tunneling, a topic that received limited attention in management literature.