Abstract: By using resource dependence theory, this paper examines how organizations use their board of directors and board committees to mitigate environmental uncertainty. By using a randomly selected panel data from 129 Fortune 500 firms between 2002 and 2006, we found that organizations that face high levels of environmental uncertainty increase their board and board committee meeting frequency. Our results also show that there is a negative link between environmental uncertainty and multiple directorships of board members. This study provides a nuanced understanding of board-level tactics that organizations use as a response to environmental uncertainty.

Abstract: Firms employ full absorption, partial absorption and political strategies to manage their external dependencies. Political strategies have received only minor academic attention. We study corporate political activity through board composition over time in the context of substantial regulatory change. We advance the construct of board political capital and explicate the conditions under which the level of board political capital changes and the condition under which board political capital affects firm performance.

Abstract: Resource dependence theory posits that director interlocks are important means for firms to manage their external dependencies while gaining access to critical resources. Since the development of resource dependence theory, however, the technology-driven economy has emerged in which knowledge has increased in importance and is now recognized as a critical resource for developing and sustaining competitive advantage. In our proposed study, we intend to examine the resource dependence role knowledge may play in directing interlock formation. We introduce three forms of knowledge dependence—competitive, institutional, and technological—and using a sample of technology-based firms test the influence of knowledge dependencies on the likelihood of director interlock formation.

Abstract: Proxy advisors are gatekeepers that provide voting recommendations to shareholders. While proxy advisors are becoming more influential, we have little evidence of how they influence shareholder dissent outside of the US context. Drawing on resource dependence theory, we examine the organizational and institutional factors that affect shareholder’s dependence on proxy advisor recommendations. Based on a multilevel analysis of 13,627 voting results from 16 Western European countries, we theorize that organizational factors substitute for proxy advice by providing internal governance resources capable of remedying agency problems. Moreover, we suggest that institutional factors affect shareholders’ strategic behavior, either promoting trading or monitoring roles. Finally, we document that the quality of proxy advice differs cross-nationally and is less predictive of agency problems in relationship-based than in market-based contexts.